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I. INTRODUCTION
The sores of civil war and the ethnic cleansing between various tribal groups
1
have long plagued the continent of Africa. The country of Chad has been no
2
exception to this sad reality. In 1979, a civil war within the borders of this
3
particular region ended; however, it did not take long for the bloodshed to
4
resume. Only two short years later, then Defense Minister Hissene Habré
overthrew the national unity government and began a campaign of widespread
5
repression. This repression was largely characterized by nothing short of the
6
ethnic cleansing of all groups, with the exception of the Goranes and their allies.
After the people of Chad endured eight long years of torture and killings, Habré
was eventually overthrown from his position of power by one of his former
generals, Idriss Deby, who ousted Habré from his reign of terror with the aid of
7
Libyan forces. It was Idriss Deby who established the Commission of Inquiry
into the Crimes and Misappropriations, Committed by Ex-President Habré, His
Accomplices and/or Accessories (“the Commission of Inquiry”) to investigate
8
the nature and full extent of Habré’s dealings.
The investigative findings of the Commission of Inquiry are overwhelming;
according to the investigation, from the period of 1982 to 1990, “[t]he
9
Commission of Inquiry counted no less than 3,780 dead.” This statistic does not
10
include the death of twenty-six foreigners. These numbers should give us all
great pause; unfortunately, the statistics only get worse. The Commission of
Inquiry further found that 54,000 political prisoners were detained during the
11
same period. Even still, the Commission of Inquiry was careful to note that
these figures constitute only a modest indicator as to the scope of the calamity,
while in reality “[t]he Commission [of Inquiry] estimates in fact that the work it
12
has done covers no more than 10 percent of everything that has happened.” As

1. See generally Anup Shah, Conflicts in Africa–Introduction, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.
globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-africa-introduction (last updated May 12, 2010).
2. See generally Chad Profile, BRITISH BROADCASTING CHANNEL NEWS, (July 3, 2013, 6:40 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13164690.
3. See generally Chad: Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into the Crimes and Misappropriations,
Committed by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories, in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES,LAWS, RULINGS, AND REPORTS 51, 52 (Neil J.
Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter Chad].
4. Id.
5. See id. at 58-61.
6. Id. at 92.
7. Id. at 53, 92.
8. Id. at 53.
9. See generally id. at 80.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 81.
12. Id. at 80.
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one might assume, these findings have spurred a series of litigation against
13
Hissene Habré.
Despite all the evidence of Hissene Habré’s crimes against humanity, an
14
underlying procedural issue has presented itself. The issue is whether Habré
may be prosecuted for his actions despite the fact that no such crimes for those
15
same actions were codified under national law at the time they were committed.
16
This procedural issue is best resolved by considering both international law as
17
well as some of the underlying principles of natural law theory. It is the position
of this Comment that relevant international law, set against the background of
natural law theory, holds that independent sovereign nations should be able to
prosecute the most egregious of human rights offenses despite a procedural ex
post facto issue.
While the ex post facto “issue” in the particular case of Hissene Habré has
18
garnished a lot of attention as of late, it is perhaps important to note that the
application of the ex post facto doctrine is far from an infrequent incident in the
19
context of international law. Quite to the contrary, the application of the ex post
facto doctrine has served to be a serious problem for the international community
20
for quite some time. Most notably, the problem became quite serious in as early
as 1945 when members of the Nazi regime were prosecuted for various war
21
crimes in Nuremburg, Germany. On this world stage, the international
community was forced to grapple with how to hold some of the most sinister
22
officials in the modern era accountable for crimes that did not exist. Surely
enough, the prosecution of Hissene Habré is a true test for how the international
community will address the pervasive ex post facto problem.
Section II of this Comment begins by discussing the ex post facto issue as
discussed by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and the Economic
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) Court of Justice in the suits

13. See Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 2, 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/news/ 2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed.
14. See generally Jan Arno Hessbruegge, ECOWAS Court Judgment in Habré v. Senegal Complicates
Prosecution in the Name of Africa, 15 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 1 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/15/issue/4/ecowas-court-judgment-habr%C3%A9-v-senegal-complicates-prosecution-name-africa.
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Parts V.A, VI.B.
18. See Miša Zgonec-Rožej, African Union Tribunal Opens to Try Chad’s Habre, CHATHAM HOUSE
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/189331.
19. See generally Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
554 (1995).
20. See generally id.
21. See generally Charles Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial, A Dangerous Precedent, THE ATLANTIC,
(Apr. 1, 1946, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-a-fair-trial-adangerous-precedent/306492/?single_page=true.
22. See generally id.
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23

brought against Habré. This section will further detail the specific underlying
issue of this Comment, which examines the context in which Hissene Habré
24
should be prosecuted for his actions. Section III will discuss the role that
25
international law plays in the issue. Section IV will sample a few international
26
cases related to the focus of this Comment. Section V will consider two
competing legal theories, natural law theory and legal positivism, and how each
27
theory either legitimizes or competes with the thesis of this Comment. In turn,
Section VI of this Comment will argue that principles of international law and
natural law theory support the conclusion that the option to prosecute Habré
within the Senegalese court system should have been preserved, and the creation
28
of the ad hoc tribunal is necessary. Finally, Section VII of this Comment will
conclude with a word on why the ex post facto issue is important for the
international community, and what implications this particular case will have for
29
similar inquiries in the context of international criminal law.
II. THE EX POST FACTO PROBLEM VS. HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Litigation in the International Court of Justice
In 2005, many victims of Habré’s alleged crimes against humanity brought
30
suit in Belgium under its laws that provide for universal jurisdiction over
31
international crimes committed abroad. In that same year, and in consideration
of the allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a Belgian judge
32
issued an arrest warrant for Habré. Soon after, Belgium directly filed a case
with the ICJ in which it demanded either the extradition or prosecution of Habré
in accordance with Belgium’s own obligation under the Convention Against
33
Torture (“CAT”). In July of 2012, the ICJ found that by failing to submit the
case of Habré to its competent authorities, Senegal had breached its obligation
34
under article 7, paragraph 1 of CAT. The Court further held that, “the Republic
23. See infra Parts II.A-C.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Parts III.A-D.
26. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
27. See infra Parts V.A-B.
28. See infra Parts VI.A-B.
29. See infra Part VII.
30. See Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, supra note 13 (Belgium’s 1993 universal
jurisdiction law permitted victims to file complaints in Belgium for atrocities committed abroad. Although the
law was repealed in 2003, some cases that were already being investigated by Belgian courts, including
Habré’s, were allowed to continue).
31. Hessbruegge, supra note 14.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Press Release ¶5
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of Senegal, must, without further delay, submit the case of Mr. Hissène Habré to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution if it does not extradite
35
him.” It was this ruling that led to the next chapter of litigation for Hissene
36
Habré, which would take place at the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
B. Litigation in the ECOWAS Court of Justice
In October of 2008, Habré filed a case with the ECOWAS Court of Justice in
order to seek relief from a prosecution by the Senegalese government in
37
accordance with a mandate issued by the African Union. While litigating his
case with the ECOWAS Court of Justice, Habré argued that at the time the
alleged international crimes were committed, Senegal did not have the necessary
38
laws to assert jurisdiction over him. Habré’s argument was based on a provision
39
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Article
15 of the covenant provides, “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offense on account of any act or omission, which did not constitute a criminal
40
offense, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.”
Upon consideration of the argument presented by Habré, the ECOWAS
Court concluded that international custom requires international tribunals to try
international crimes, while national courts only have jurisdiction over crimes that
41
have already been codified under national law. The court reasoned that, “if the
factual basis of the intention to try the applicant did not constitute criminal acts
under national law of Senegal . . .they are under the international law obligation
42
as such.” The ECOWAS Court made clear that the mandate issued by the
African Union must be implemented in accordance with international custom and
any other endeavor by Senegal outside this framework would violate the
43
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. Moreover, any such action would
44
additionally desecrate the stand against impunity.

(July 20, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17084.pdf.
35. Id. at ¶ 6.
36. Hessbruegge, supra note 14.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
41. See Hissène Habré v. Senegal, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10, ¶ 58 (Ct. of Justice of the Economic
Community of States of West Africa 2010), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/2012041
9T034816-Habre%20Ecowa%202010.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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C. Recent Moves by Senegal in Compliance with the ECOWAS Decision
After the 2010 judgment issued by the ECOWAS Court, Senegal and the
African Union have faced the challenge of establishing an ad hoc special
45
tribunal. The initial effort has been met with much success; a joint effort by
46
international donors has resulted in total contributions of nearly $12 million.
While the funding of the special tribunal has been successful, continued efforts
between Senegal and the African Union will be necessary to finalize the
47
tribunal’s structure. Tentatively, the tribunal’s structure is designed to include
48
four chambers: accusation, instruction, session, and appeals.
Despite the initial success of setting up the ad hoc tribunal, there has been
mounting pressure by the African Union to complete the process as quickly as
49
possible. It has been over twenty years since Habré’s destructive reign over the
50
people of Chad, and the survivors are anxious for their day in court. Assuming
the establishment of the tribunal continues with little resistance, the people of
Chad should take solace in the fact that Habré’s prosecution will stay in Africa
through the promulgation of the ad hoc tribunal in Senegal, rather than being
51
moved to a foreign location that has little to no link to Habré’s victims.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITIES
A. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In this case, one of the relevant primary sources of international law is
52
CAT. This law is most applicable to Habré’s case because it speaks directly to
53
the offense of torture and other related transgressions. Senegal became a
signatory to CAT on February 4, 1985, and it was ratified in Senegal on August

45. Christopher Tansey, Bringing Hissène Habré to Justice: Senegal to Create a Special Tribunal in
Compliance with ECOWAS Court Judgment, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Apr. 25, 2011), http://hrbrief.org/2011/
04/bringing-hissene-habre-to-justice-senegal-to-create-a-special-tribunal-in-compliance-with-ecowas-courtjudgment/.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See generally Senegal Tribunal to Try Hissene Habre, SUDAN VISION DAILY (Sept. 2, 2013),
http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=219239 (emphasizing the long wait of victims hoping for
litigation to continue).
51. Tansey, supra note 45.
52. See Hessbruegge, supra note 14.
53. Mary Penrose, It’s Good to be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former Heads of State
Under International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 193, 207 (2000).
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54

21, 1986. The law has several provisions that have particular force in the instant
case. Part one, article four of the law provides:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit
torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or
participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make these offences
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their
55
grave nature.
This provision essentially requires that each signatory to CAT take proactive
56
measures to codify acts of torture under its criminal law. However, article seven
of part one is even more pertinent to Habre’s case, paragraph one stipulates:
The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged
to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in
the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit
57
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
As noted above, this particular provision under CAT is what concerned the
58
ICJ. Under the Convention, a signatory country must either extradite or
59
60
prosecute. This is precisely what the ICJ held, and it is within this legal
61
framework that the ECOWAS Court held that Habré must be charged.
B. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
An additional source of international law to be discussed is the Universal
62
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). The UDHR was proclaimed by the
63
64
United Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948. The UDHR

54. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment pmbl.,
June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 24841 [hereinafter CAT].
55. Id. at art. 4(1).
56. See id.
57. Id. at art. 7(1).
58. See supra Part II.
59. See CAT, supra note 55, at arts. 5, 7.
60. Hessbruegge, supra note 14.
61. See generally Hissène Habré, supra note 41.
62. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948),
available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [hereinafter UDHR].
63. The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the United
Nations. Comprising all 193 Members of the United Nations, it provides a unique forum for multilateral
discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter of the United Nations. About the
General Assembly, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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is truly a milestone document in the history of human rights as it sets out, for the
first time, several fundamental human rights to be universally recognized and
65
protected. In particular, Article 11, subsection 2 provides,
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal
66
offence was committed.
It is this same language the ECOWAS Court found problematic when
67
holding Senegal itself could not prosecute Habré under its domestic law.
C. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
68

Another source of international law that must be addressed is the ICCPR.
Article 15, subsection 1 states, “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was
69
committed.” This provision looks substantially similar to Article 11, subsection
70
2, of the UDHR. In fact, it seems the only real difference is that the ICCPR
71
replaces the term “penal offence” with “criminal offence.” That being said,
there is a critical difference within the text of Article 15, subsection 2. This
provision states, “[n]othing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed,
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
72
community of nations.” The second paragraph specifically provides that the first
paragraph does not prevent an act to be tried that was criminal under the general
73
principles recognized by the community of nations. The distinction in the text

64. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, History of the Document, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
65. See generally UDHR, supra note 62.
66. Id. at art. 11(2).
67. William Schabas, Bizarre Ruling on Non-Retroactivity From the ECOWAS Court, PHD STUDIES IN
HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 4, 2010, 11:26 AM), http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2010/12/bizarre-rulingon-non-retroactivity.html.
68. ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 15(1).
69. Id.
70. Cf. UDHR, supra note 62, at art. 11(2).
71. ICCPR, supra note 40, at art. 15(1).
72. Id. at art. 15(2).
73. Id.
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between the UDHR and the ICCPR is important and will be discussed in greater
74
detail in upcoming sections.
D. The Rome Statute
A final source of international law relevant to the case of Hissene Habré is
what is known as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome
75
Statute”). In July of 1998, a conference was held among some 160 States to
76
establish the first treaty-based permanent International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
The treaty adopted at this conference is what serves as the basis of the Rome
77
Statute. Within the Rome Statute, crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction
are listed along with rules of procedure that allow states to cooperate with the
78
ICC. Several of the relevant crimes listed in Rome Statute include: genocide,
79
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. The
codification of these crimes in the Rome Statute was negotiated on the basis of a
draft for the statute submitted by the Preparatory Committee on the
80
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The International Law
81
Commission originally prepared this same draft. One of the essential ideals
promulgated by the International Law Commission is that responsibility for
82
international crimes must be recognized. It was this central ideal that ultimately
83
led to the establishment of the ICC. Although the Rome Statute did not become
84
effective until July of 2002, and Hissene Habré’s reign of terror lasted from
85
roughly 1981 through 1989, the general principles recognized by the
International Law Commission and the ICC are worth acknowledging. Wideranging communities of states have recognized that crimes such as genocide,
86
crimes against humanity, and war crimes need to be enforced. This important

74. See infra Part VI.A.
75. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
76. What is the Rome Statute?, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/3.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 75.
80. Laura Barnett, The International Criminal Court: History and Role, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, (Nov.
4, 2008), http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0211-e.htm.
81. Id.
82. See Introduction: Origin and Background of the Development and Codification of International Law,
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
83. Id.
84. Rome Statute, supra note 75.
85. Chad, supra note 3, at 90; Hessbruegge, supra note 14.
86. Rome Statute, supra note 75, at pmbl.
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international recognition must be considered as the international community
processes Habré’s responsibility.
IV. CASES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Nuremberg Trials
The Nuremburg trials held at the Palace of Justice in Germany circa 1944,
may be considered one of the earliest instances in which war criminals were
87
prosecuted in the face of the principal of non-retroactivity. At this proceeding,
“[t]wenty-four major political and military leaders of Nazi Germany” were
indicted for various offenses including crimes against humanity, aggressive war,
88
and war crimes. Also, over a hundred additional defendants were tried before
89
the United States Nuremburg Military tribunals. These individuals, from many
walks of German society, were represented in a series of twelve separate trials
90
known as the “Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings.”
A hallmark of the Nuremburg proceedings is that trial judges based many of
the charges not on any rule of domestic law, since none existed, but instead on
91
the basis of international rule. Valentina Spiga explains, “[i]n so doing, the
Nuremburg International Military Tribunal adopted the doctrine of substantive
justice as opposed to that of strict legality: that is, even in the absence of a clear
rule banning conduct as criminal, acts that seriously harm society should not go
92
unpunished.” The connection between this assertion promulgated by the
93
Nuremburg Court and Article 15(2) of the ICCPR is no coincidence. As Spiga
94
continues to explain, “[t]herefore, the occasio legis of these exceptions was
most probably the intention to support, ex post, what had already been asserted in
95
96
Nuremburg.” The history of the proceedings held in Nuremburg, when read in
97
conjunction with Article 15(2) of the ICCPR, provides support for the
proposition that there are some crimes recognized by the international

87. Valentina Spiga, Non-Retroactivity of Criminal Law, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 5, 11 (Mar. 2011).
88. Nuremburg Trials, MILITARY LEGAL RESOURCES (July 16, 2010), http://loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/Nuremberg_trials.html.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Spiga, supra note 87, at 11.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 7; ICCPR, supra note 40, at art. 15(2).
94. ERNEST BRUNCKEN, SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 59 (Fred B. Rothman et al. eds., 1st ed. 1969)
(Occasio legis: Latin; external circumstances causing the making of the rule).
95. Spiga, supra note 87, at 12.
96. Id.
97. UDHR, supra note 62, at art. 15(2).
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community that should not go unpunished because of the presence of an ex post
98
facto issue.
B. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Having looked at the issue of non-retroactivity of criminal law from a
historical perspective, it is also helpful to consider a more recent case. As
discussed above, the ECOWAS Court made clear that Habré could only be
punished for violations against international law through the proceedings of an
99
ad hoc international tribunal to be established in Senegal. This decision serves
as a contrast to the recent prosecution against former Liberian President Charles
100
101
Taylor. Taylor was convicted in April of 2012 of eleven charges, including
acts of terror, rape, and the conscription of child soldiers during the course of the
102
1991-2002 civil war within Liberia. Additionally, Taylor was convicted for
aiding and abetting rebels who committed war crimes and crimes against
103
humanity in nearby Sierra Leone.
The prosecution of Taylor serves as a unique chapter in international law in
one important way; Taylor was the first African head of state to be convicted by
104
an international court. The proceedings brought against Taylor were done
105
through The Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) in The Hague. The
SCSL was established jointly by the government of Sierra Leone and the United
106
Nations. The SCSL mandate is specifically to try individuals like Taylor, who
are alleged to have committed violations of international humanitarian and Sierra
107
Leonean law.
While one might initially recognize the similarities between the SCSL and
the ad hoc international tribunal mandated by the ECOWAS Court of Justice,
there are also important differences between the two courts. Most importantly,
the tribunal set up to prosecute Habré has been established within Africa on
108
Senegalese soil. This is an important distinction because the SCSL lost much of
its legitimacy by prosecuting Taylor in The Hague, as opposed to its normal
98. Spiga, supra note 87, at 10.
99. Hissène Habré, supra note 41, at 61.
100. Tansey, supra note 45.
101. Ex-Liberia Leader Charles Taylor’s 50-year Sentence for War Crimes Sticks as He Loses Appeal,
CBS NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013, 9:03AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-liberia-leader-charles-taylors-50-yearsentence-for-war-crimes-sticks-as-he-loses-appeal/.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Home, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.scsl.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
107. Id.
108. Tansey, supra note 45.
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location in Freetown. Contrastingly, Senegal’s decision to host an ad hoc
tribunal keeps Habré’s prosecution within Africa rather than moving it to a
110
distant forum like The Hague. This is a noteworthy distinction since moving
the forum abroad would likely disrupt any real connection to survivors and the
111
families of those who have passed. The difference between the two forums
highlights an important finding: true justice in the prosecution of international
crimes is best served in closest proximity to those who have fallen victim to the
112
crimes.
Although there are important differences between the SCSL in The Hague
and the ad hoc tribunal established to prosecute Habré, there are also significant
similarities. One important similarity is the necessity of raising funds on an
113
international scale. As noted earlier, the joint effort by a number of
international donors has resulted in total contributions of nearly $12 million for
114
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunal in Senegal. Funding the SCSL has not
115
been a de minimus experience either. The operation of the SCSL has required
voluntary contributions of some forty different nation-states throughout the
116
world. The most significant of these donations have come from Canada, the
117
Netherlands, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United
118
Nations also contributed funding through subventions in 2004, 2011, and 2012.
The reality that both the SCSL and the ad hoc tribunal in Senegal have been
incredibly expensive should not be ignored. The expense that these particular
tribunals mandate delays the effective administration of justice and fails to utilize
119
available resources. Proponents of these tribunals argue the tribunals can ensure
120
regional security, or may be the only viable alternative in the face of legitimate

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A
Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 734 (2003).
113. Compare Senegal: Hissene Habré Court Opens, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb 8. 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/08/senegal-hissene-habre-court-opens (listing Chad, the European Union, the
Netherlands, the African Union, the United States, Germany, Belgium, France and Luxembourg as international
donors), with The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Home, supra note 106 (reporting that contributions have been
made from over 40 different states from around the world).
114. Tansey, supra note 45.
115. The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Home, supra note 106.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See generally Celina Schocken, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Overview and Recommendations,
20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 436 (2002).
120. See Prosecutor vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2013)
(“Due to concerns about regional security should the trial be held in Sierra Leone, the Special Court arranged
for the trial to be held at The Hague in the Netherlands”).
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procedural issues. But, prosecution under the framework of the national court
system is much more cost effective in light of the considerable expense needed to
122
run the ad hoc tribunal.
V. COMPETING LEGAL THEORIES
A. Natural Law Theory
In addition to looking at international statutory law and other similar
international law cases, natural law theory serves as another basis for concluding
that retroactivity does not require Habré to be prosecuted through the means of
an ad hoc international tribunal. In order to understand the basic principles of
natural law theory, the inquiry must start with the teachings of Thomas Aquinas,
123
who is credited with founding the framework of the theory. In his celebrated
work Summa Theologiae, Aquinas defined “law” as, “nothing else than an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
124
community, and promulgated.” It is from this basic definition that the theory of
125
natural law arises.
According to natural law theorists, the basis of natural law theory lies within
126
the first clause of Aquinas’s definition. The focus of the definition is the
127
understanding that law is nothing more than an extension of reason. For
128
Aquinas, the law must be a rational standard of conduct. Without the basis of
reason there can be no law, and law not founded upon the principles of reason is
129
no law at all.
In addition to the premise that law is founded upon reason, natural law theory
rests upon another assumption: there are fundamental principles of law that can
130
be found through nature. These same fundamental principles serve as the basis
by which man may judge not only what is right but what ought to govern his own

121. See generally Hessbruegge, supra note 14 (discussing the prohibition to retroactively assert
jurisdiction over international crimes).
122. See supra Part II.C.
123. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Benziger Bros. ed. 1947) (1911).
124. Id. at 1332.
125. John Finnis, Natural Law Theories, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/natural-law-theories/ (last updated July 25, 2011).
126. Mark C. Murphy et al., Natural Law Theory, THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 15, 16 (Martin P. Golding &William A. Edmundsom eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE].
127. Id. at 16.
128. Id. at 18.
129. Id. at 19.
130. William O. Einwechter, Natural Law: A Summary and Critique, DARASH PRESS (Sept. 30, 2012),
http://darashpress.com/articles/natural-law-summary-and-critique.
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actions. How are we to discover these fundamental principles? The answer is
straightforward. The principles of the natural or inherent law that exist through
132
nature are discoverable by the employ of the right use of reason. These inherent
principles exist and apply to mankind at all times and without concern for the
133
circumstance. Finally, natural law theory stands for the proposition that once
we have discovered the principles of law in nature, law codified by the state or
government is authoritative only in so far as it is derivative from these principles
134
of law in nature. Thus, natural law theory focuses its inquiry on what the
application of reason reveals about the place of humanity within its natural
135
origin, rather than on what states have codified into law.
136
The natural law theory has been met with some criticism. One of the
primary criticisms of natural law theory is that many things, which are in one
137
sense unnatural, are not considered by many people to be unethical. Examples
include an assortment of medical technologies, including vaccinations and
138
chemotherapy. By the same logic, critics also identify some things, which are
139
in a sense natural, but are believed by many to be unethical. Some examples in
140
this regard include the feelings of revenge or prejudice. Another prevalent
criticism often advanced by those who oppose the natural law theory is that men
141
do not know, nor can they agree upon the content of natural law. Despite the
fact that natural law theory has been around for hundreds of years, humanity
142
cannot agree upon a detailed codification of the laws of nature. While this
argument is valid to a certain extent, it is difficult for the critic of natural law
theory to maintain that there is not any agreed upon understanding of the laws of
143
nature. natural law proponents respond that certain actions, including torture
144
and genocide, are in reality, commonly recognized laws of human nature.

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Finnis, supra note 125.
136. See HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-82 (2d ed. 1994).
137. Natural Law Theory, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, http://www83.homepage.villanova.edu/richard.
jacobs/MPA%208300/theories/natural%20law.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Einwechter, supra note 130.
142. Id.
143. See generally Finnis, supra note 125.
144. See generally id.
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B. Legal Positivism
145

Legal positivism is often cited as a foil to natural law theory. The
jurisprudence of legal positivism proposes that the only legitimate sources of the
law are those expressly enacted, adopted, or recognized by a governmental entity
146
through its executive, legislative or judicial bodies. By requiring the law to be
147
written, legal positivist theory ensures members of society will be explicitly
placed on notice as to their rights, and the legal obligations the state demands
148
from them. Furthermore, legal positivism asserts that societies have developed
legal systems that depend largely on certain structures of governance, and not on
the extent to which it satisfies notions of democracy, the rule of law, and various
149
ideals of justice.
One of the hallmarks of legal positivism is what is known as the separability
150
thesis. Generally speaking, “the separability thesis asserts that law and morality
151
are conceptually distinct.” While some scholars read this to mean that the
152
definition of law must be entirely free from notions of morality, other scholars
153
have taken a less exclusive approach to the issue. Herbert Lionel Adolphus
Hart, taking on the latter view, once described the separability thesis by stating,
“the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce
154
or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.”
Although the separability thesis maintains that there are moral constraints on
legal validity, “it still implies the existence of a possible legal system in which
155
there are no moral constraints on legal validity.”
156
The application of legal positivism has also been met with robust criticism.
One of the most cited criticisms of the legal positivist theory is that it fails to give
157
morality its due consideration. Critics assert:
A theory that insists on the facticity of law seems to contribute little to
our understanding that law has important functions in making human life

145. Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 3, 2003),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/.
146. Id.
147. Kenneth Einar Himma, Legal Positivism, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY: A PEER
REVIEWED ACADEMIC RESOURCE, http://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/#H2 (last updated June 28, 2005).
148. Green, supra note 145.
149. Id.
150. Himma, supra note 147.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See generally Hart, supra note 136.
154. Id. at 185-86.
155. Himma, supra note 147.
156. See generally Finnis, supra note 125.
157. Green, supra note 145.
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go well, that the rule of law is a prized ideal, and that the language and
practice of law is highly moralized. Accordingly, positivism’s critics
maintain that the most important features of law are not to be found in its
source-based character, but in law’s capacity to advance the common
158
good, to secure human rights, or to govern with integrity.
In other words, the critics of legal positivism cite the separability thesis and
159
its fundamental implications as the source of the issue. The critics maintain that
any legal construction necessarily depends, to some extent, on a notion of
160
morality.
The conflicts between natural law theory and legal positivism are clear.
Under the former, whether or not an act is a wrong, and thus punishable by the
law, depends upon the employment of reason to deduce binding rules of moral
161
behavior. Under the latter, whether or not an act is a punishable wrong depends
not on what the human condition says about the morality of the act, but rather
162
what a particular legal enactment says is a punishable wrong. Unlike the legal
positivist theory, natural law is less concerned with what the law itself says or
whether it exists in codified form, and is instead focused on what our common
163
human nature recognizes as a just or unjust act. Natural law theory is an active
164
inquiry, asking whether or not the action is right or wrong. In contrast,
positivist theory employs a passive inquiry by focusing on the extent to which the
law is systemically valid. In other words, whether or not it is part of the legal
165
system.
The application of either one of these theories can produce strikingly
different results as to whether or not individuals should be prosecuted based on a
166
retroactive theory of guilt. For example, it is evident that natural law provided
some foundation for the prosecution of Nazi leaders and offenders of the
Holocaust, but in the same context legal positivists face a unique difficulty in that
these same offenders were merely following the law as a product of the relevant
167
political system. While legal positivism certainly has its merits in certain

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
See generally Finnis, supra note 125.
See generally id.
Mark Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-law-ethics (last updated Sept. 27,
2011).
162. Green, supra note 145.
163. Murphy, supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. Green, supra note 145.
166. Legal Positivists Theory, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS,
http://elearning.la.psu.edu/crim-soc467/lesson-3/legal-positivist-theory (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
167. See generally DAVID FRIEDRICHS, LAW IN OUR LIVES: AN INTRODUCTION 78-83 (Dawn
VanDercreek et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2001).
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circumstances, it is the position of this Comment that a strict adherence to legal
positivism at all times can be a dangerous practice often resulting in grave
168
injustices to the human race. Legal positivism emasculates the social function
169
of the law by preventing it from serving human needs. A law removed from
human need and human nature has no place in our society. This Comment
assumes the application of a natural law perspective because, “the most important
features of law are not to be found in its source-based character, but in law’s
capacity to advance the common good, to secure human rights, or to govern with
170
integrity.”
VI. SOLUTIONS
A. From the Perspective of International Law
Despite the ruling of the ECOWAS Court, the option to prosecute Habré
within the Senegalese court system should have been preserved, and the creation
of the ad hoc international tribunal is all but necessary. As stated previously,
171
Article 15, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR is plainly worded; the provision explicitly
requires only that the crime committed be a criminal offense under national or
172
international law at the time it was committed. Surely the drafters of the
provision must have included the reference to “international law” for a reason. It
seems evident that the only reason to include this language would be to ensure
that an individual could not escape punishment for an international crime simply
by noting that the crime charged was not punishable under the national law at the
173
time the act was committed.
Some may argue that the basic rationale for having a prohibition of
retroactive criminal laws is to give the perpetrator proper notice that their
174
action(s) constitutes a crime. This is undoubtedly a noble and just rationale;
indeed, the notion that one may be charged for a criminal act in which there is no
175
possible way to know the act is criminal offends our sense of justice. That
being said, we must remember that Habré was acting as a head of state during the
176
commission of his offenses. Acting in the head of state capacity necessarily
implies correspondence with foreign nations, and at least a basic awareness of

168. Id. at 80.
169. Legal Positivists Theory, supra note 166. See generally Green, supra note 145.
170. Green, supra note 145.
171. See ICCPR, supra note 40, at art. 15(2).
172. Id.
173. Hessbruegge, supra note 14.
174. Id.
175. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
335, 340 (2005).
176. Chad, supra note 3, at 51-54.
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international law and custom. To say that Habré was not put on notice of the fact
his actions were criminal is an assertion which cannot be supported. The actions
177
of Habré were quintessentially criminal. In the history of the human race, little
else has been more sinister than the ethnic cleansing and torture of other human
178
beings. When crimes of this nature are committed, notice that the action is
179
wrong necessarily accompanies the act. As Jan Hessbruegge explains, “[t]he
rationale behind the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws is to put the
perpetrator on notice that his or her action constitutes a crime, but this is already
served if the perpetrator could have known that he or she was committing what is
180
recognized as a crime on the international plane.” Hessbruegge applies a “could
have known” standard to the notice issue, which is a relatively low burden to
181
satisfy. This standard is easily met when applied to a former head of state.
An additional argument, often made in favor of the prohibition of retroactive
criminal laws, is that Article 15, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR is a subsidiary means
182
of interpretation. It has been said, “[t]his provision appears as a sort of fallback
option. . . to be relied upon when neither national law nor treaty or customary
183
international law rules criminalize certain conduct.” To begin, let it suffice to
say that this is not the issue with respect to Habré’s case. As has been identified
184
above, the ICCPR does criminalize much of Habré’s conduct. But, the question
still remains as to whether Article 15, paragraph 2 should be limited to instances
185
where international law does not criminalize the conduct. The circumstance
suggested by this interpretation of Article 15, paragraph 2 is a situation where
there is no international law on the issue, but where the act is criminal according
186
to general principles of law. It is argued that “the principle of legality is hardly
reconcilable with the criminalization of certain conduct only on the basis of
187
general principles of law.” While this argument makes sense within the context
of lesser offenses, the same should be said of a crime that is of such a grave
nature as torture and a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Article 15, paragraph 2 was
included for a reason, to provide a safeguard to punish acts which are so heinous
188
that it would offend our sense of humanity to let them go unpunished.
177. See generally id.
178. See Sverre Varvin, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Psychoanalytic and Social-Psychological
Viewpoints, 18 SCAND. PSYCHOANAL. R. 192, 192-210 (1995).
179. Hessbruegge, supra note 14.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Spiga, supra note 87, at 5.
183. Id.
184. ICCPR, supra note 40, at art. 15(1).
185. Spiga, supra note 87, at 9-11.
186. See generally id.
187. Id. at 13-14.
188. See generally Christian Tomuschat, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED
NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/iccpr/iccpr.html (last
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B. From the Perspective of Natural Law Theory
The application of natural law theory stands for the proposition that,
irrespective of the ECOWAS Court ruling, Habré could have been prosecuted
within the current Senegalese legal system. As a result, the employ of an
international ad hoc tribunal hosted in Senegal, although consistent with the
ECOWAS Court ruling, is all but necessary. To summarize, one of the essential
claims of natural law theory is that it “is based on the belief that certain
principles of law are inherent in the very nature of things and that men can
189
discern these by means of reason.”
Let us again recall the extent and capacity of the crimes against humanity
that Habré is alleged to have committed. As outlined by The Commission of
Inquiry, it was determined that no less than 3,780 people were killed as a direct
190
result of the ethnic cleansing campaign brought on by Habré’s reign of terror. It
is difficult to even conceive of an act more heinous than one defined by a mission
191
to exterminate those of a particular race or tribe. Murder based on a hatred of a
192
specific group clearly finds itself in violation of the natural law theory. As
explained by Aquinas,
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain; but only the more grievous vices,
from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those
that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human
society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft
193
and such like.
As outlined above, Aquinas argues that certain injurious acts such as murder
194
are violative of an inherent understanding of right and wrong within all of us.
Aquinas maintains that it is basic reason common to all mankind that such
195
actions are unjust and are qualified as an inherent wrong. Accordingly, by this
line of reasoning, acts of genocide are inconsistent with the basic tenants of
196
natural law theory.

visited Mar. 22, 2014).
189. Einwechter, supra note 130.
190. Chad, supra note 3, at 80.
191. See Varvin, supra note 179, at 192-95.
192. AQUINAS, supra note 123, at 1363.
193. Id.
194. See generally id.
195. See generally id.
196. See generally id.
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Having concluded that acts of ethnic cleansing are determined by reason to
be in violation of natural law, the next question is whether a theory of natural law
justifies prosecuting Habré under the current Senegalese legal system for a crime
that was not codified when committed. The answer to this question is that such
197
an action is entirely within the scope of the natural law theory. As is concluded
above, the principles of law, as they exist in nature, apply to everyone at all times
198
and in all circumstances. This is necessarily the case as the entire essence of
natural law theory is dependent upon the reasonable conclusion of what is right,
199
as held in common by humanity. Furthermore, natural law theory stands for the
proposition that man-made laws are only just so long as they stem from the
200
principles of law in nature. The assumption of this claim is that principles of
law exist prior to their codification.
In the particular case at issue, ethnic cleansing unquestionably violates
principles of law as they exist in nature. Hence, the fact that an act was
committed before a specific codification was established, in a specific location, at
a specific time does not change the quality or the character of the act. The act of
201
ethnic cleansing is an inherent wrong that does and has existed in perpetuity.
Therefore, natural law theory supports the proposition that Habré could well be
prosecuted for his crimes against humanity under the framework of the
Senegalese legal system even despite the procedural ex post facto issue
202
presented.
VII. CONCLUSION
What is the fundamental aim of any legal system if not justice? To where do
the victims of terror and ethnic cleansing turn when procedure stands in the way
of their vindication? Are there no worse crimes than these? Such are the
questions that this Comment has had the occasion to address. The inquiry as to
whether Habré may be prosecuted for his actions despite the fact that no such
crimes for those same actions were codified under national law at the time they
203
were committed is not an easy question to confront. It is true the ECOWAS
Court was left with only two options, both of which ran the risk of setting the
204
worse of two precedents. One the one hand, a ruling allowing Senegal to
prosecute within the bounds of its national court system might have affirmed a
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
(1993).
202.
203.
204.
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kind of universal jurisdiction in Africa, potentially allowing for the future
205
prosecution of similar crimes. Indeed such a ruling might have been possible
had the ECOWAS Court given more clout to the second paragraph of Article 15
206
207
of the ICCPR, which pays tribute to the Natural Law legal philosophy.
Alternatively, the ECOWAS Court chose instead to set a precedent that on
occasion would require African nations to establish a completely separate
system, which would depend entirely on international funding, even if only a
208
single individual were to stand trial. Which precedent is the better of the two?
This Comment stands for the proposition that independent sovereign nations
should be able to prosecute the most egregious of human rights violations despite
the principle of non-retroactivity. This proposition is supported directly by
209
international statutory law. Additionally, this same proposition champions the
210
principles of natural law legal theory. Natural law theory was not chosen
because it was convenient to do so. Rather this legal theory was chosen because
it is the most consistent with the universal truth that the freedom of life is the
211
quintessence of our existence. A rule of law inconsistent with such a notion, as
was issued by the ECOWAS Court, delays justice, wastes resources, and misses
the most perfect opportunity to send a message to political leaders who continue
to reduce the value of life to its ethnic origins.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
ICCPR, supra note 41, at art. 15(2).
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